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TOWARD THE CENTRAL MEANING OF
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: NON-SUNDAY




UNDAY closing laws, or "blue laws,"' are state statutes criminaliz-
ing the operation of certain businesses, the performance of certain
types of labor, or the selling of certain goods on Sunday.2 Although
*B.B.A., University of Miami; LL.B., J.D., University of Maryland. Professor of
Law, Southwestern University School of Law. The author wishes gratefully to acknowledge
those persons who commented on earlier drafts of this Article: Elena Dunlap, Linda Miller,
Paul N. Savoy, Bernice L. Uhrich, and Jonathan K. Van Patten.
1. On the history of the Sunday closing laws, see W. BLAKELY, AMERICAN STATE PA-
PERS BEARING ON SUNDAY LEGISLATION (1891); G. HARIS, SUNDAY LAWS (1892); W.
JOHNS, DATELINE SUNDAY U.S.A. (1967); A. LEWIS, SUNDAY LEGISLATION: ITS HISTORY
TO THE PRESENT TIME AND ITS RESULTS (1902).
2. See ALA. CODE §§ 13-6-1 to -2 (1975); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-3852 to -3853 (1977);
KY. REV. STAT. §§ 436.160, .165 (Baldwin Supp. 1981); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 51-191 to
-195 (West 1965 & Supp. 1980-1981); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, §§ 3201-3209 (1965 &
Supp. 1980-1981); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 521 (1957 & Supp. 1980); MASS. ANN. LAWS
ch. 136, §§ 5-6 (Michie/Law. Co-op 1972 & Supp. 1981); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 624.01-.04
(West 1964); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 97-23-63, -67 (1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 578.100 (Vernon
1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 332.D:1-:2 (Pam. Supp. 1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:171-
5.8 (West 1971); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-346.2 (1969); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-30-01 (1976);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 907-908 (West 1958); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 7361, 7363
(Purdon 1973 & Supp. 1980-1981); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 11-40-1 to -2 (1969); S.C. CODE
§§ 53-1-40 to -80 (1976); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-4001 (1975); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13,
§§ 3351-3356 (Supp. 1980-1981); VA. CODE § 18.2-341 (1975 & Supp. 1980); W. VA. CODE
§ 61-10-25 (1977).
In recent years, state courts have divided on the question of whether Sunday closing stat-
utes are constitutional, although these challenges were based on due process and equal pro-
tection claims rather than on religious freedom claims. Cases holding state Sunday closing
laws unconstitutional in whole or part include Piggly-Wiggly of Jacksonville, Inc. v. Jack-
sonville, 336 So. 2d 1078 (Ala. 1976); Caldor's, Inc. v. Bedding Barn, Inc., 177 Conn. 304,
417 A.2d 343 (1979); Rutledge v. Gaylord's, Inc., 233 Ga. 694, 213 S.E.2d 626 (1975); Cour-
tesy Motor Sales v. Ward, 24 Ill. 2d 82, 179 N.E.2d 692 (1962); Boyer v. Ferguson, 192 Kan.
607, 389 P.2d 775 (1964); City of Ashland v. Heck's, Inc., 407 S.W.2d 421 (Ky. 1966); West v.
Winnsboro, 252 La. 605, 211 So. 2d 665 (1968); State v. Target Stores, Inc., 279 Minn. 447,
156 N.W.2d 908 (1968); Scagg-Way Dep't Stores, Inc. v. City of Omaha, 179 Neb. 707, 140
N.W.2d 28 (1966); People v. Abrahams, 40 N.Y.2d 277, 353 N.E.2d 574, 386 N.Y.S.2d 661
(1976); State v. Greenwood, 280 N.C. 651, 187 S.E.2d 8 (1972); Spartan's Indus., Inc. v.
Oklahoma City, 498 P.2d 399 (Okla. 1972); Kroger Co. v. O'Hara Township, 481 Pa. 101,
392 A.2d 266 (1978); Scaggs Drug Centers, Inc. v. Ashley, 26 Utah 2d 38, 484 P.2d 723
(1971); County of Spokane v. Valu-Mart, Inc., 69 Wash. 2d 712, 419 P.2d 993 (1966); Nation
v. Giant Drug Co., 396 P.2d 431 (Wyo. 1964). Sunday closing laws have been held constitu-
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some states temper their Sunday closing laws with religious exemptions 3
or, in the case of Texas, with an option to remain open for business on
either Saturday or Sunday,4 most of these laws mandate strict restrictions
on Sunday business activity. Blanket Sunday closing laws have an invidi-
ous effect on people who, for religious reasons, choose to observe some day
other than Sunday as a day of rest. These non-Sunday Sabbatarians5 are
forced to choose between working on their observed Sabbath or refraining
from work and suffering the economic consequences. In the words of
United States Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart, the non-Sunday Sab-
batarian is forced "to choose between his religious faith and his economic
survival. That is a cruel choice. It is a choice which I think no State can
constitutionally demand. ' '6 Nonetheless, in 1961 a majority of the
Supreme Court ruled to the contrary and upheld Sunday closing statutes
in McGowan v. Maryland7 and its companion cases.8
tional in Bill Dyer Supply Co., Inc. v. State, 255 Ark. 613, 502 S.W.2d 496 (1973); Brown
Enterprises, Inc. v. Fulton, 192 N.W.2d 773 (Iowa 1971); State v. SS Kresge, Inc., 364 A.2d
868 (Me. 1976); Hechinger Co. v. State's Attorney, 272 Md. 706, 326 A.2d 742 (1974); Zayre
Corp. v. Attorney Gen., 372 Mass. 423, 362 N.E.2d 878 (1977); Genesco, Inc. v. J.C. Penney
Co., 313 So. 2d 20 (Miss. 1975); Opinion of the Justices, 108 N.H. 103, 229 A.2d 188 (1967);
Vornado, Inc. v. Hyland, 77 N.J. 347, 390 A.2d 606 (1978), appeal dismissed sub noma. Vor-
nado v. Degnan, 439 U.S. 1123 (1979); City of Bismarck v. Materi, 177 N.W.2d 530 (N.D.
1970); Whitney Trading Corp. v. McNair, 255 S.C. 8, 176 S.W.2d 572 (1970); Gibson Dis-
trib. Co. v. Downtown Dev. Ass'n of El Paso, Inc., 572 S.W.2d 334 (Tex.), appeal dismissed,
439 U.S. 1000 (1978); State v. Giant of St. Albans, Inc., 128 Vt. 539, 268 A.2d 739 (1970);
Malibu Auto Parts, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 467, 237 S.E.2d 782 (1977).
3. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 3209 (1965); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27,
§§ 492(2)-(3) (Supp. 1980); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 136, § 6(8) (Michie/Law. Co-op 1972);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 624.03 (West 1964); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 7363 (Purdon 1973); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 3354(l)-(2) (Supp. 1980-1981); VA. CODE § 18.2-343 (1975).
4. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 9001 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981). An attempt to
repeal Texas's blue law failed during the 1981 legislative session. See Dallas Morning
News, May 3, 1981, § G, at 1.
5. The term "Sabbatarian" is a misnomer as it is popularly used to describe those
whose practices diverge from Sunday observance. All who adhere to a day of rest on reli-
gious grounds are technically Sabbatarians. WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 2191 (2d unabr. ed. 1950). For this reason, this Article refers to
those who observe their Sabbath on a day other than Sunday as a non-Sunday Sabbatarian.
In the United States today are more than one million non-Sunday Sabbatanans, including
an estimated 750,000 orthodox Jews, 425,000 Seventh Day Adventists, and 500,000 Seventh
Day Baptists. 118 CONG. REC. 705 (1972) (remarks of Senator Randolph). In addition, the
Worldwide Church of God membership is estimated to be 100,000. Whalen, The Worldwide
Church of God, 37 U.S. CATH., Nov. 1972, at 19-20; Wiley, .4 Constitutional Outrage, 74
LIBERTY 3 (1979). There are also other faiths such as Islam that celebrate Sabbath on a day
other than Sunday. See Rodman v. Robinson, 134 N.C. 503, 510, 47 S.E. 19, 21 (1904). See
generaly L. PFEFFER, CHURCH STATE AND FREEDOM (rev. ed. 1967).
6. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 616 (1961) (Stewart, J., dissenting). See also
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 87 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(members of minority religions should not be forced "to make the cruel choice of surrender-
ing their religion or their job"); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 564 (1961) (Douglas,
J., dissenting) (first amendment requires government neutrality in areas of theology or rit-
ual).
7. 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
8. Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Market of Mass., Inc., 366 U.S. 617 (1961);
Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); Two Guys From Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. Mc-
Ginley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961). See also Arlan's Dep't Store of Louisville, Inc. v. Kentucky,
371 U.S. 218 (1962) (per curiam dismissal); Friedman v. New York, 341 U.S. 907 (1951) (per
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The problem of accommodating the special concerns of the non-Sunday
Sabbatarian sheds light on the fundamental relationship of religion and
the state. In disputes concerning religion in the schools, state aid to reli-
gious schools, tax exemptions for religious institutions, regulation of reli-
gious practices, and autonomy of religious bodies from investigation by
the state, the underlying structural question is the balance between the
conflicting requirements of the first amendment that mandate the separa-
tion of church and state as well as the free exercise of religion.9
The pervasive debate centers around whether the Constitution demands
strict religious neutrality by the state or whether the state may, or indeed
must, make some accommodation in its laws for religious minorities to
assure their free exercise of religion. The concept of "strict neutrality" is
the analogue to "color blindness" under the equal protection clause. A
society that observes "strict neutrality" could never permit a "religion-
based" classification, be it to disadvantage a religion, aid a church, or ac-
commodate a religious practice. As with problems of racial discrimina-
tion, "strict neutrality" treats religion by ignoring it.' 0
This Article examines the Sunday closing law cases and demonstrates
why they are inconsistent with the first amendment and the constitutional
jurisprudence that has evolved in analogous contexts in the two decades
since McGowan. The conclusion reached is that "strict neutrality" in reli-
gious questions rarely is permissible in a society constitutionally commit-
ted to religious freedom. The conceptual analyses employed are
applicable directly to the myriad of questions raised under the religion
clauses and suggest a resolution of a number of questions heretofore con-
sidered intractable. Despite the changes in the law and methodology of
constitutional interpretation, the United States Supreme Court may con-
tinue to deny a review of the claims of non-Sunday Sabbatarians. This
opinion is based on an analogy to the constitutional experience of both
judicially recognized and nonrecognized minority groups, particularly ra-
cial and non-Christian religious minorities.
curiam dismissal). For an exhaustive list of earlier state court decisions validating the laws,
see the concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter in McGowan, 366 U.S. at 497-99, 508-12.
9. The first amendment of the Constitution provides: "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .. " U.S.
CONST. amend. I. The first clause is referred to as the "establishment clause;" the second
clause is the "free exercise clause."
10. For a discussion of the concept of "neutral principles," see Wechsler, TowardNeu-
tral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959); Pollak, Racial Discrimina-
tion and Judicial Integrity. A Reply to Professor Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1959); and
Wright, Professor Bickel, The Scholarly Tradition, and the Supreme Court, 84 HARV. L. REV.
769, 776 (1971). The rather confusing cases and perhaps inherently perplexing interplay
between the establishment clause and the free exercise clause suggest that experience and
sensitivity rather than logic or neutral principles are the tools necessary for interpretation.
Professor Laurence Tribe suggests that religion involves "a realm in which faculties beyond
reason, and experience often removed from the public sphere, prove central to most concep-
tions of the values at stake." L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 812 (1978).
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I. THE SUNDAY CLOSING CASES
In 1961 the United States Supreme Court reviewed and ruled on the
constitutional validity of a number of Sunday closing laws. In each case
the Court sustained the state restrictions over the constitutional claims of
workers, employers, customers, and non-Sunday Sabbatarians. 1" In Mc-
Gowan v. Maryland12 the Court held that so long as a regulation serves a
nonreligious state objective, no violation of the first amendment's estab-
lishment clause occurs. 13 McGowan concerned a challenge to Maryland's
Sunday closing laws' 4 by employees of a large department store. The em-
ployees argued that the statutes violated the constitutional guarantees of
religious freedom and the separation of church and state. 15 Chief Justice
Warren, writing for the majority, dismissed the religious freedom claim on
grounds that the plaintiffs had no standing to raise the issue.' 6 The Court
reasoned that the litigants did not allege that their own religious freedom
was infringed by the statutes, nor did they specifically allege a religious
freedom infringement of the store's non-Sunday Sabbatarian customers.' 7
For the Court to hear such actions, the claims must be ruled personal to
those whose religious liberties are affected or coerced by the regulation in
question.' 8 Nonetheless, the Court did uphold standing on the employees'
contention that the Sunday closing statutes were, in effect, a law respecting
the establishment of religion in violation of the first amemdment.19 The
specific establishment clause complaints of the litigants were that the state
chose Sunday to require business closings because Sunday is the Sabbath
day observed by most Christian sects, and as such it aided "the conduct of
church services and religious observance of the sacred day."'20 In rejecting
the establishment clause claim, Chief Justice Warren noted the relevancy
of the history of the Sunday closing laws and concluded that although such
laws originally were motivated by religious reasons, 2' the emphasis had
shifted to secular considerations:
[I]t is not difficult to discern that as presently written and adminis-
tered, most [Sunday closing laws] are of a secular rather than of a
11. Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Market of Mass., Inc., 366 U.S. 617 (1961) (cus-
tomers); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (non-Sunday Sabbatarians); Two Guys
From Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961) (proprietor); McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) (employees).
12. 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
13. Id. at 451-52. Using a rational, deferential standard of judicial scrutiny, the Court
also held that Sunday closing laws are not in violation of the fourteenth amendment's equal
protection clause. In this context, the equal protection issue is devoid of religious overtones.
14. For the current Sunday closing laws in Maryland, see MD. ANN. CODE art. 27,
§§ 492-534C (1957 & Supp. 1980).
15. 366 U.S. at 429-30.
16. Id at 429.
17. Id at 429-30.
18. Id; accord, Harris v. McRae, 100 S. Ct. 2671, 2689-90, 65 L. Ed. 2d 784, 806-07
(1980).
19. 366 U.S. at 430. The Court conferred standing because plaintiffs suffered a "direct
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religious character, and that presently they bear no relationship to es-
tablishment of religion as those words are used in the Constitution of
the United States. 22
The secular justification cited by the Court in support of the closing laws
was the state's interest in providing a universal day of rest for all citizens. 23
Using Sunday as the particular day is not impermissible under the estab-
lishment clause according to the Court, even though it happens to coincide
with the Sabbath observed by a majority of Christians, because:
[I]t is common knowledge that the first day of the week has come to
have special significance as a rest day in this country. People of all
religions and people with no religion regard Sunday as a time for
family activity, for visiting friends and relatives, for late sleeping, for
passive and active entertainments, for dining out, and the like. 24
In reaching this result, the Court followed a purpose and effect test for
determining whether a statute violates the establishment clause. This test
was first hinted at in Everson v. Board of Education,25 in which a taxpayer
challenged a state statute authorizing local school districts to reimburse
parents for the cost of transporting their children to and from private
schools on public buses.26 A portion of this reimbursement money was
paid to Catholic parents who sent their children to Catholic parochial
schools.27 The taxpayer argued, inter alia, that the statute was a law re-
specting the establishment of religion in violation of the first amendment's
establishment clause.28 In rejecting this challenge the Court provided an
extensive discussion of the meaning of the establishment clause, stating:
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church.
Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or pre-
fer one religion over another. . . . In the words of Jefferson, the
clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect
"a wall of separation between church and State."' 29
Although the establishment clause does not require the state to be an ad-
versary of religion,30 the Everson Court concluded that it does require neu-
trality between the state and religious and nonreligious groups. 3' So long
as the primary purpose of a state law or regulation and its effects were
secular, the incidental benefits or burdens placed upon religious entities
were constitutionally tolerable.32 Thus, while any aid or assistance ad-
vances the religious mission, that effect is overshadowed by any secular
22. Id at 444. The Court also noted that Sunday closing laws are no longer supported
exclusively by religious groups. Id at 435. See Note, State Sunday Laws and the Reigious
Guarantees of the Federal Constitution, 73 HARV. L. REV. 730-31 (1960).
23. 366 U.S. at 445.
24. Id at 451-52.
25. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
26. Id at 3.
27. Id.
28. Id at 8.
29. Id at 15-16 (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878)).
30. 330 U.S. at 18.
31. Id
32. Id at 17. See also L. TRIBE, supra note 10, at 835-46.
1981]
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objectives of education, health, and safety. The Court has since proffered
an additional test: the program or practice should not create an excessive
entanglement between church and state. 33
On the same day McGowan was decided, the Court also rejected the
constitutional claims of a department store owner in Two Guysfrom Harri-
son-Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley,34 the operators of a Kosher market in Gal-
lagher v. Crown Kosher Super Market of Massachusetts, Inc.,35 and
orthodox Jewish merchants in Braunfeld v. Brown.36 In Two Guys from
Harrison-Allentown, Inc. a large discount department store brought suit to
enjoin enforcement of Pennsylvania's Sunday closing laws, which forbade
the selling of certain items and the performance of "worldly employment"
or business on Sunday.37 Chief Justice Warren, in writing for the major-
ity, dismissed the plaintiff's constitutional claims on grounds identical to
those in McGowan after finding various state legislative and judicial dis-
avowments of the religious character of the statutes. 38 The Court, how-
ever, did comment on the religious wording of the statutes, which referred
to Sunday as "the Lord's day," used the term "Sabbath Day," and recog-
nized days other than Sunday as "secular days."' 39 According to the Court,
these words remained in the statute only because of legislative oversight in
failing to remove them 4° and not because of any attempt to aid a religion.
Unlike McGowan and Two-Guys from Harrison-Allentown, Inc., the
Court reached the free exercise of religion claims in Braunfeld v. Brown 4'
and Gallaher v. Crown Kosher Super Market of Massachusetts, Inc. 42 In
these cases orthodox Jewish merchants, who observed their Sabbath on
Saturday, challenged respectively the constitutionality of Pennsylvania's
and Massachusetts' Sunday closing laws.43 The Court in Gallagher de-
ferred its analysis of this issue to Braunfeld, where the merchants com-
33. See Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980)
(reimbursement to church sponsored schools for mandated testing); New York v. Cathedral
Academy, 434 U.S. 125 (1977) (reimbursement to nonpublic schools for testing and record-
keeping); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977) (aid to nonpublic schools); Committee for
Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973) (tax relief to nonpublic
school children invalid); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (aid to nonpublic
schools); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (tax exemption for nonprofit church
property); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) (textbook loans to private schools);
School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (nonsectarian readings from the Bible in pub-
lic school invalid). The tendency to produce political divisiveness is an emerging third test.
See Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 372 (1975). This test relates to the problems of annual
appropriations to private schools at the primary and secondary levels.
34. 366 U.S. 582 (1961).
35. 366 U.S. 617 (1961).
36. 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
37. 366 U.S. at 585; see Act of July 10, 1961, § 1, 1961 Pa. Laws 560 (current version at
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7361 (Purdon 1973 & Supp. 1980-1981)).
38. 366 U.S. at 584-85.
39. Id at 594.
40. Id
41. 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
42. 366 U.S. 617 (1961).
43. Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Market of Mass., Inc., 366 U.S. 617, 631 (1961);
Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 601 (1961).
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plained that Pennsylvania's Sunday closing law impaired their ability to
earn a livelihood. Their faith required abstention from all work on their
Sabbath, which extended from sundown Friday to sundown Saturday.44 It
also prohibited adherents from shopping on the Jewish Sabbath. The
Court rejected these arguments and concluded that the statute did not em-
brace any religion or force anyone to accept a particular religion; 45 the
burden imposed on non-Sunday Sabbatarians was only an indirect burden
on the exercise of religion.46 Thus, the statute did not violate the free exer-
cise clause. In its dismissal of the free exercise claim, the Court pro-
nounced:
If the purpose or effect of a law is to impede the observance of one or
all religions or is to discriminate invidiously between religions, that
law is constitutionally invalid even though the burden may be charac-
terized as being only indirect. But if the State regulates conduct by
enacting a general law within its power, the purpose and effect of
which is to advance the State's secular goals, the statute is valid de-
spite its indirect burden on religious observance unless the State may
accomplish its purpose by means which do not impose such a bur-
den.4
7
In Braunfeld the Court also rejected judicially imposed exemptions for
non-Sunday Sabbatarians because of the administrative problems it feared
would result.48 The reluctance to inquire into the validity of claimed relig-
iosity, the need to police on two days in order to assure compliance with a
closing law, and the problem of determining when violations occur,
prompted the denial of this alternative. 49
The most troubling problem for the Court in handling these cases was
that if it allowed non-Sunday Sabbatarians to operate businesses on Sun-
day, they would enjoy a monopoly and an unfair advantage over the mem-
bers of majority sects forced to take Sunday off.50 These free exercise
claims are closely linked to the Court's analysis of the establishment clause
claims as noted in McGowan 5 The finding that Sunday closing laws were
not maintained for the purpose of aiding a religion or all religion was criti-
cal to their validity. Although the Court conceded in an exhaustive study
of the history of the closing laws that Sunday was recognized as having
been a religiously motivated choice for a day away from labor at the time
of origin of these laws, it concluded that over the centuries, this religious
connotation had been lost.52
44. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 601 (1961).
45. Id at 603.
46. Id at 606.
47. Id. at 607.
48. Id at 608-09.
49. Id Enforcement difficulties also are discussed in McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S.
420, 428 (1961). The enforcement problems were termed "near insuperable," in Gallagher
v. Crown Kosher Super Market of Mass., Inc., 366 U.S. 617, 623-24 (1961).
50. 366 U.S. at 608-09.
51. 366 U.S. 420, 431-53 (1961).
52. For the Court's discussion of the history of Sunday closing laws, see McGowan v.
19811
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II. McGoWAN AND BRA UNFELD RECONSIDERED
The Supreme Court has not reviewed the Sunday closing cases in the
past two decades although it had an opportunity to do so recently in Super-
markets General Corp. v. Maryland. 3 In that case the Court summarily
dismissed another challenge to the same Maryland Sunday closing law
sustained in McGowan although Supermarkets General Corp. and several
other cases taken to the Court in the last few years arose primarily from
claims of economic liberty rather than free exercise of religion. Neverthe-
less, one can conclude that despite the denial of the appeal in Supermarkets
General Corp., the Court simply is avoiding another difficult issue, not in-
dicating its approval of the Maryland Supreme Court's ruling.54 Ample
support exists for the rejection in the near future of the result and the un-
derlying principles of McGowan v. Maryland.55
A. Standing and Overbreadth Under Free Exercise
The challenges to Sunday closing laws mounted in recent years have not
been brought by non-Sunday Sabbatarians.5 6 McGowan emphasized that
free exercise of religion challenges could not be raised by those whose reli-
gious scruples were not directly coerced by the challenged measure.57 This
rule is grounded in the standing requirement of article III of the Constitu-
tion 58 that requires the complainant to possess a personal stake in the con-
troversy.59 Sunday worshippers and nonreligious litigants, nevertheless,
are injured by the Sunday closing laws, 60 suffer as a result of them, 61 and,
accordingly, would have their claim vindicated by a Court holding the
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 431-34 (1961); see also the historical discussion in Justice Frank-
furter's concurring opinion in McGowan. Id at 470-511.
53. 286 Md. 611, 409 A.2d 250 (1979), appeal dismissed, 101 S. Ct. 45, 66 L. Ed. 2d 3
(1980). The Court has also refused each opportunity to review Sunday closing laws during
recent terms. See, e.g., Morris v. Texas, 439 U.S. 1129 (1979); Vornado, Inc. v. Hyland, 77
N.J. 347, 390 A.2d 606 (1978), appeal dismissed sub noma. Vornado v. Degnan, 439 U.S. 1123
(1979); Gibson Distrib. Co. v. Downtown Dev. Ass'n of El Paso, Inc., 572 S.W.2d 334 (Tex.),
appeal dismissed, 439 U.S. 1000 (1978). See also Arlan's Dep't Store of Louisville, Inc. v.
Kentucky, 371 U.S. 218 (1962) (dismissing appeal for want of substantial federal question).
54. The Maryland Supreme Court dismissed the plaintiffs religious freedom claims by
following the holding and rationale of McGowan. 409 A.2d at 254-57.
55. 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
56. See note 53 supra.
57. 366 U.S. at 429-30.
58. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
59. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186
(1962).
60. For cases supporting the proposition that standing may be found only when the
plaintiff suffers injury not generally experienced by all in society, see Duke Power Co. v.
Carolina Envt'l Study Group, 438 U.S. 59 (1978) (residents in immediate area of nuclear
power plant have standing); United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973) (environmental-
ists have standing to challenge freight rates that discourage recycling of resources); Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (plaintiff has standing to challenge political redistricting on
grounds that redistricting dilutes his vote).
61. See, e.g., Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970)
rivate computer companies have standing to challenge government regulation that causes
em economic harm).
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laws to be constitutionally invalid. In light of recent liberalized rulings on
standing, Sunday worshippers and nonreligious individuals now should
qualify to raise the interests of non-Sunday Sabbatarians. 62 The claims of
religious minorities ought to be permitted to be litigated under the doctrine
of constitutional jus tertii, the doctrine allowing surrogate litigants to raise
the rights of third parties because of the difficulty for such third parties to
assert their own rights. 63 The doctrine also explains the recent judicial
expansion of standing rights. The costs and difficulty of constitutional liti-
gation imposes a substantial impediment to religious minorities who at-
tempt to assert rights in the free exercise arena. 64
Closely related to the question of standing is the first amendment speech
doctrine of overbreadth, which operates to invalidate statutes purporting
to outlaw protected as well as unprotected first amendment free expression
activity.65 If a statute prohibits protected expression, it is overbroad and is
susceptible to judicial invalidation. The Court allows a litigant whose ac-
tivity is capable of regulation under a narrowly drawn statute to raise the
62. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (beer vendors may assert interests of
underaged potential customers); Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106 (1976) (physicians may
raise interests of patients); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (pharmacists may raise interests of customers). But see
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (low income plaintiffs lack standing to challenge zon-
ing law against low income housing). Warth presents an example wherein the poor and
racial minorities are increasingly unable to have their causes litigated. See J. KUSHNER,
APARTHEID IN AMERICA 88-91 (1980); Kushner, Apartheid in America: An Historical and
LegalAnalysis of Contemporary Racial Residential Segregation in the United States, 22 How.
L.J. 547, 634-37 (1979).
63. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (distributor of contraceptives may
assert rights of unmarried users); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953) (white sellers of
housing may assert claims of blacks in attacking racially restrictive covenants); Sedler,
Standing to Assert Constitutional Jus Tertii in the Supreme Court, 71 YALE L.J. 599 (1962);
Note, Standing to Assert Constitutional Jus Tertii, 88 HARV. L. REV. 423 (1974).
64. The Burger Court adhered to a liberal view of standing to assert the rights of others
in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (licensed female beer vendor may raise a constitu-
tional challenge to statute based on age-sex differential on behalf of objections of males 18-
20 years old). But see Harris v. McRea, 100 S. Ct. 2671, 65 L. Ed. 2d 784 (1980) (standing
denied to plaintiff who was challenging restrictions on government funding of abortions on a
free exercise claim). In Harris the Court emphasized that only allegations of personal coer-
cion satisfied the standing requirement. Id at 2689-90 (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490
(1975)). Nonetheless, the Court's summary rejection of standing probably was based on the
belief that the substantive argument was frivolous, not on a studied analysis of the standing
issue.
65. See generally Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REV.
844 (1970); Note, Overbreadh Review and the Burger Court, 49 N.Y.U.L. REV. 532 (1974).
For an example of the continued vitality of the doctrine, see Village of Schaumburg v. Citi-
zens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620 (1980). The doctrine was criticized by some
members of the Court in Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972), and denied in Broadrick
v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973). Broadrick involved a challenge to the state act prohibit-
ing partisan political activities by government employees. Although the overbreadth doc-
trine was not applied, the Court found a special state interest in the statute and concluded
that the statute's intrusion on protected activity was minimal. Id at 615-18. The require-
ment that the overbreadth be substantial means that there must be numerous realistic appli-
cations of the statute to protected first amendment activity, rather than a mere hypothetical
application to protected activity. Thus, the Broadrick standard remains applicable after
Schaumburg to areas of conduct where the state possesses a special interest in regulation,
but not in other cases involving substantial first amendment protected activities.
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potential impact of the statute on hypothetical third parties. 66 The ration-
ale for the doctrine is that the regulation may inhibit the exercise of pro-
tected speech activity, invite prosecutions by law enforcement, or be used
as a pretext for local officials to single out unpopular views for "special
attention" under the statute.67 Free exercise of religion is as fundamental
to liberty as freedom of expression. Indeed, it is a vital aspect of both
personal autonomy and expression. Unquestionably, laws that interfere
with the free exercise of religious beliefs and practices chill both the free-
dom to exercise religion and, in many cases, the willingness to pursue con-
scientious beliefs or to join a nontraditional religious order. Accordingly,
the overbreadth doctrine should be applied in the free exercise area to al-
low those not personally coerced to raise the rights of religious minorities.
The relief orders in all such cases would not necessarily require the whole-
sale invalidation of the overbroad regulation. For instance, a truant from
public school could not have a court strike down compulsory education
laws because of the failure of the laws to exempt the Amish or other con-
scientious objectors. Rather, the courts could establish an exemption from
the challenged statute for religious minorities where such a construction
would leave in place a regulation that would not chill free exercise. The
problem with free speech and expression is the near impossibility of listing
all of the protected activities that might be immune from a defectively
overbroad rule, while a blanket exemption for religious objectors, as is
often included in statutes, would prove effective. As a result, the practical
effect of such a doctrine in the free exercise of religion area should be that
legislatures will become more sensitive to religious practices and include
religious exemptions in their Sunday closing statutes and ordinances where
appropriate. Regardless of which technique is adopted, the rights of non-
Sunday Sabbatarians should be permitted to be raised by Sunday worship-
pers and nonreligious individuals or groups.
B. Changing Standards of Judicial Review
McGowan v. Maryland is remembered less as a case of religious freedom
or the lack thereof than it is for setting forth the basic standard of review-
ing the exercise of legislative discretion when challenged under the equal
protection clause. McGowan is and remains the basic standard rule that a
"mere rational basis" is all that is needed to sustain an act of the legisla-
ture regulating economic activities.68 This deference may be explained in
66. See, e.g., Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486 (1965); Thornhill v. Alabama,
310 U.S. 88, 97-98 (1940).
67. See I N. DORSEN, P. BENDER & B. NEUBORNE, POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN
THE UNITED STATES 39 (4th ed. 1976).
68. See New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976) (push cart vendor law held to be an
economic regulation subject to deferential review); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,
272 U.S. 365 (1926) (minimal rationality scrutiny of land use controls under the due process
clause); see also L. TRIBE, supra note 10, at 994-96. In light of the environmental conditions
existing in today's urban America, the Court should reconsider the underlying rationality of
Sunday closing laws. One could argue that Sunday closing is irrational when the goal of the
legislature is an improvement in the environment and the health and safety of the public.
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part by the historical evolution of Congress and the Court from the days of
the Depression. As late as 1961 the Court was predominantly a "New
Deal" Court.69 The center of judicial controversy was that the conserva-
tive Court, under Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes, had second-
guessed the decisions of Congress aimed at protecting society from the ef-
fects of the Depression.70 The liberal model of judicial review was one of
deference to the legislature,71 an institution that in 1936 represented liberal
values when compared to the relatively laissez faire philosophies of a ma-
jority of the Court. After World War II, the focus of the legislature shifted
from issues of economic democracy. The dominant view of legislative au-
tonomy continued, however, despite the increasing legislative intolerance
of the 1950s. The experience of the "McCarthy era" and its preoccupation
with loyalty, along with the "cold war," demonstrated that judicial defer-
ence for the popular will could threaten civil liberties. This philosoph-
Today grave concern exists over both air quality and the excessive consumption of energy.
Critical needs for peak hour energy have caused utility companies to plead with customers
to cease using appliances during peak afternoon hours. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec.
Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980). The sensible approach and one consis-
tent with current goals of energy independence would be to have business and industry alter
their schedules so as not to compete at peak energy consumption periods. Legislatures soon
may be forced to require certain industries to remain open on Saturdays and Sundays and
take weekdays off to conserve energy and avoid system overloads. The alternative is the
importation of more fuel and construction of more power generating plants. Moreover, au-
tomobile pollution and the problems with our once clean air are exacerbated by the decrease
in fuel efficiency occasioned by congested freeways. Work schedules staggered to avoid con-
gestion are crucial. The alternatives of more highway construction or a shift to alternate
modes of transportation appear irrational in light of the current policies of governmental
austerity. This type of environmentally sensitive planning is actually mandated under the
federal Clean Air Act, which requires each state to establish land use and transportation
plans to permit the maintenance of certain minimum standards of air quality. 42 U.S.C.
§§ 7401-7626 (Supp. 1979). See generally W. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (1977).
In addition to the problems of pollution and energy consumption, the recreational capac-
ity of the nation is being tested. Access to beaches, campgrounds, and parks will become
even more difficult. As housing costs escalate along with the cost of transportation, the once-
relevant Sunday closing laws may confine much of America to overcrowded and overpriced
ghettos, unable to gain access to freeway ramps, places of recreation, or even decent shelter
with which to enjoy the state-mandated day of family leisure. One approach to relieving
this problem would be to shift work and recreation schedules to permit more extended use of
public recreational facilities.
69. While only Justices Black, Frankfurter, and Douglas were appointed by President
Roosevelt, the appointees of Presidents Truman and Eisenhower shared the experience of
the Depression years and generally adopted a stance of legislative deference derived in part
from the image of the legislature as a popular institution for progressive reform.
70. See, e.g., Morehead v. New York ex rel Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936) (minimum
wage for women invalidated); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (Coal Conser-
vation Act invalidated); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495
(1935) (National Industrial Recovery Act invalidated); Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Alton
R.R., 295 U.S. 330 (1935) (compulsory retirement and pension system invalidated). See also
L. TRIBE, supra note 10, at 232-36, 438-49.
71. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963) (prohibition of debt adjustment
by nonlawyers valid); National Labor Relations Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301
U.S. 1 (1937) (National Labor Relations Act valid); West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S.
379 (1937) (minimum wage for women valid); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934)
(milk price controls valid). See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 10, at 235-37, 446-55; Mc-
Closkey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An Exhumation and Reburial, 1962
Sup. CT. Rev. 34.
19811
SO UTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
ically based standard of judicial review, resting on New Deal expediency,
posed problems for the dismantlement of racial segregation and threatened
the protection of the rights of unpopular political, religious, cultural, and
racial minorities from the new intolerance of the legislatures.
Since McGowan, the Court has retreated substantially from the deferen-
tial treatment of legislative will in the context of equal protection. In more
recent cases, the Court has altered its levels of scrutiny, rejecting the ra-
tional basis test when reviewing discrimination against judicially recog-
nized suspect classes, such as racial minorities, 72 and interference with
fundamental rights. 73 This two-tiered equal protection analysis was advo-
cated as early as 1938 by Justice Harlan Stone in his famous footnote 4 in
United States v. Carolene Products Co. ,74 but his concept of "discrete and
insular minorities" still was incubating when the Sunday closing cases
were decided and has never been applied in a religious freedom context.75
72. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (strict scrutiny applied to invalidate
antimiscegenation statute because classification based on race); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379
U.S. 184 (1964) (interracial cohabitation provision invalid). But see Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (exclusion of Japanese from West Coast areas during World War
II survived strict scrutiny).
73. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (interstate travel held a funda-
mental right); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (voting held a funda-
mental right). The Court may be on the verge of identifying the right to pursue a livelihood
as a fundamental right. In this regard, note the recent judicial innovations in the area of
commercial free speech, in which the Burger Court has elevated the notion of commerical
speech to a protected status under the Constitution. First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S.
765 (1978); Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Vir-
ginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1
(1976). These cases used a much different standard of judicial scrutiny than that stated in
Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942), in which the Court pronounced its legislative
deference stance in the commercial speech area in upholding a legislative ban on handbill
circulation. The rights of non-Sunday Sabbatarians to pursue their livelihood and quest for
economic survival are important principles; a powerful policy argument can be made that
the commercial speech cases should be applied to the free exercise cases to assure economic
opportunity for those disadvantaged by restrictive laws and religious conscience. Otherwise,
the scheme of laws forces an unfair choice between religion and livelihood. Certainly, the
cavalier discussion of the economic impacts of Sunday closing laws in McGowan v. Mary-
land, 316 U.S. 420, 516 (1961), and Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 608-09 (1961), are out
of step with the heightened sensitivity for economic freedom exhibited by the Burger Court.
See also Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371 (1978) (heightened scrutiny under
the interstate privileges and immunities clause when regulations that disparately affect non-
residents touch on fundamental rights such as means to a livelihood); Sailer Inn, Inc. v.
Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 485 P.2d 529, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971) (invalidating state statutory prohi-
bition against female bartenders).
74. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). The philosophy is that certain "discrete and insular
minorities," including religious groups, are entitled to closer judicial scrutiny of discrimina-
tory legislation due to their incapacity to participate effectively in the legislative process.
75. The Burger Court has continued to adhere to this tiered approach to judicial scru-
tiny and actually has moved further from the standard of mere rationality applied by the
more deferential Warren Court. While the Court continues to apply a rational basis test to
business and economic regulation, it has adopted a middle tier of scrutiny in sex discrimina-
tion cases. Now, rather than approving any measure in which the legislative means arguably
bear some rational relationship to a legitimate legislative end, the measure actually must
serve an important governmental purpose. In the sex discrimination area, see Wengler v.
Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979); Craig v. Boren,
429 U.S. 190 (1976). See also Ambach v. Norwich, 441 U.S. 68 (1979) (alienage); Lalli v.
Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978) (illegitimacy); Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978) (alienage).
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Two terms after McGowan and Braunfeld the Court in Sherbert v. Ver-
ner 76 did refuse to apply the rational basis test to economic legislation that
had the effect of disadvantaging a religious minority. The Court invali-
dated the refusal of South Carolina to find eligible for unemployment
compensation a Seventh Day Adventist who refused Saturday work. The
disqualification of benefits, the Court held, restricted the plaintiffs free
exercise of religion.77 Justice Brennan's majority opinion used language
strikingly similar to Justice Stewart's dissent in Braunfeld to declare the
disqualification invalid:
The [State] ruling forces [plaintiff] to choose between following the
precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and
abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in order to accept
work, on the other hand.
[To condition the availability of benefits upon this [plaintiff's] will-
ingness to violate a cardinal principle of her religious faith effectively
penalizes the free exercise of her constitutional liberties.78
The Court continued by ruling that the state's interest in enforcing the
benefit disqualification was not compelling enough to uphold the statute's
constitutionality in the face of this religious infringement. 79 By using a
standard of judicial review somewhat higher than the rational relationship
test, the Court found the state's interest in preventing fraudulent claims by
people feigning religious objections to Saturday work "wholly dissimilar"
to the compelling state interests upheld in the Sunday closing law cases.80
Less restrictive alternative means of achieving South Carolina's objectives
were available.8 ' Moreover, the Court distinguished Sherbert from Braun-
feld by noting that the Sunday closing laws upheld in Braunfeld imposed a
"less direct burden" on religious freedom than the infringement imposed
by South Carolina's unemployment benefits statute.82
76. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
77. Id at 404. The Court employed an intense scrutiny under the equal protection
clause in the Sherbert decision, a level of review that appears to be more demanding than
that applied in Braunfeld. This compelling state interest examination previously was em-
ployed in NAACP v. Alabama, 357 US. 449 (1958) (protecting membership lists from broad
disclosure demands). Ironically, Justice Harlan, the author of NAACP v. Alabama, wrote
the dissent in Sherbert, arguing for a more deferential stance. Sherbert recently was ap-
proved in Thomas v. Review Bd., 101 S. Ct. 1425, 67 L. Ed. 2d 624 (1981).
78. 374 U.S. at 404, 406.
79. Id. at 406-07.
80. Id at 407-08.
81. Id at 407.
82. Id at 408. The Sunday closing requirement may put some marginal non-Sunday
Sabbatarian entrepreneurs out of business; others may be unaffected. Still others, preferring
not to be open on weekends, will applaud the suppression of competition from those who
otherwise might operate all seven days. Thus, the Court could conclude that the economic
impact of the Sunday closing law is speculative, whereas the denial of benefits in Sherbert
was a certainty. Historically, the Court has been more sensitive to the character of an act
than to its practical consequences. While the losses from Sunday closing were seen in Braun-
fid as an indirect result, the loss of benefits in Sherbert was direct and nonspeculative. If
the Court, by use of the label "indirect" meant that businesses fail by poor management or
the natural processes of the market, the relevant economic test should look to the similarly
situated entrepreneur who is not a non-Sunday Sabbatarian. In a market composed of mar-
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Justice Stewart's concurring opinion in Sherbert emphasized quantita-
tive impacts in comparing the unemployment statute with Sunday closing
laws. Stewart believed the infringement on the plaintiff's religious free-
dom in Sherbert to be "considerably less onerous" than the infringement
imposed on non-Sunday Sabbatarians and upheld by the Court in the
Sunday closing cases. 83 Thus, he concluded that Braunfeld should be
overruled explicitly because of the Court's inconsistent reading of the free
exercise clause. 84 Justice Harlan, in his dissenting opinion, stated unequiv-
ocally that Sherbert overruled Braunfeld,85 reasoning that the secular pur-
pose of South Carolina's statute was even clearer than the Sunday closing
law upheld in Braunfield because it aimed to promote fiscal integrity. 86
The success of the "less restrictive alternatives" strategy in Sherbert sug-
gests that Sunday closing laws have been allotted undue deference. They,
too, are susceptible to such alternatives as a "one day in seven" closing law
that would allow the non-Sunday Sabbatarian or anyone to decide which
day to close. 87 This analytical tool, the less restrictive alternative, has been
applied in the first amendment free exercise context for at least twenty
years88 and, in fact, was considered in Mc Gowan.89 The problem with Mc-
Gowan is not so much that the Court failed to investigate less restrictive
alternatives to Maryland's closing law, or to apply strict scrutiny, but,
rather, that it accepted as compelling the secular justification for the law
offered by the state. Maryland's environmental and administrative justifi-
cations, by subsequent standards, would be judged rational, yet not com-
pelling. Further, the argument of more difficult enforcement for a
religious exemption is not compelling by even subsequent Warren Court
decisions. 90 The proper inquiry is whether the state's important goal of
having a quiet day when the entire family can assemble is compelling and
whether an exemption for non-Sunday Sabbatarians or a "one day in
seven" type of measure would preclude the state from achieving its objec-
tive. Such alternatives probably would not alter the basic character of
Sundays or the employment practices of industry and commerce. The
traditional Christian practice of Sunday Sabbath will remain pervasive, as
ginal profit operators, the failure of the law to accommodate religious liberty can strike a
fatal economic blow. A person may be forced to abandon a chosen profession, children may
be discouraged from joining a family firm, and the community may be deprived of a valua-
ble resource. The Court appears to have been concentrating on qualitative impacts and not
the occasional tragedy of quantitative impacts.
83. Id.
84. Id at 417.
85. Id at 421.
86. Id
87. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 450-53 (1961).
88. See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (religious solicitation);
Schneider v. Irvington, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (religious solicitation).
89. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 449-53 (1961).
90. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (administrative inconvenience does
not justify denial of fair hearing before termination of welfare benefits); Shapiro v. Thomp-
son, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (statutory provisions denying welfare assistance to residents who
have not resided in jurisdiction for one year do not promote compelling government inter-
est).
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proven by the experiences of jurisdictions that have avoided or abandoned
Sunday closing laws. The practice of exempting non-Sunday Sabbatarians
from a Sunday closing requirement cannot be demonstrated to destroy or
even affect significantly the aims of a day of rest.
The Court's analysis of compulsory education and the problems of reli-
gious accommodation reveals a different degree of deference. In Wisconsin
v. Yoder 91 the Court held that the salutary state objective of universal
compulsory education was not superior to the sincerely held beliefs of
Amish parents that secondary education conflicted with their religious
scruples. 92 A rational or even a compelling interest simply is not enough
to override religious freedom unless the state's objective is critical to health
and safety and a no less restrictive alternative is available. Yet, the state's
desire that families have a day together has been deemed more compelling
than the societal goal of universal minimal educational standards.
Granted, there may be cases where the state's health or safety concerns are
compelling, as in compulsory vaccination, for example. 93 Arguably, the
refusal of religious minorities to be vaccinated against infectious diseases
poses a different problem, as the general population might be exposed to
harm. That an exception for non-Sunday Sabbatarians from the Sunday
closing laws would cause a similar societal threat, a break in consistency, is
a specious argument. All closing laws already contain extensive excep-
tions. The extent of exceptions in the Pennsylvania and Connecticut clos-
ing laws has prompted courts in those states to invalidate their Sunday
closing statutes.94
A final analogy to this problem is the Court's decision in Pruneyard
Shopping Center v. Robins,95 upholding the California Supreme Court's
ruling that the state's constitution guaranteed the right to circulate peti-
tions on the premises of a privately owned shopping center. In this case a
group of high school students filed suit to enjoin the owners of a private
shopping center from prohibiting access to the center for the purpose of
circulating political petitions.96 In response to the students' first amend-
ment free speech argument,97 the owners claimed that the California
Supreme Court's decision amounted to an unlawful taking of their prop-
erty under the fifth amendment, as applied to the states under the four-
teenth amendment. 98
The Court rejected the owners' claim, noting that only a few persons
would be circulating in a place open to the public where thousands passed
91. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
92. Id at 234-35.
93. See, e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
94. See note 2 supra. See also L. TRIBE, supra note 10, at 855. In addition, at least
fifteen states have legislatively repealed Sunday closing laws. Note, Sunday Closing Laws in
the United States.- An UnconstitutionalAnachronism, 11 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 1089, 1090 n.7
(1977).
95. 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
96. Id at 77.
97. Id at 80.
98. Id at 82.
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on an hourly basis. 99 While the character of the state's interference with
an owner's right to exclude might appear to constitute an unlawful taking,
the Court held that impact was so slight and the purpose of the permission
so important that no taking had occurred. 1°° In the same way, to excuse
that de minimis class of non-Sunday Sabbatarians from the Sunday clos-
ing laws would in no way threaten the goal of a common day of rest, only
the goal of symmetry.' 0 Their labors would blend easily with the much
larger class of exempted activities.
C Historical Basisfor the Sunday Closing Statutes
In McGowan v. Maryland the Court emphasized the relevancy of the
historical basis of Sunday closing laws in determining whether such stat-
utes infringed the first amendment's establishment clause.' 02 Attempts at
structuring constitutional norms upon the historical record, however, have
proved to be problematic at best.' 0 3 As historian Edward Hallett Carr has
written:
Our examination of the relation of the historian to the facts of history
finds us . . . in an apparently precarious situation, navigating deli-
cately between the Scylla of an untenable theory of history as an ob-
jective compilation of facts, of the unqualified primacy of fact over
interpretation, and the Charybdis of an equally untenable theory of
history as the subjective product of the mind of the historian who es-
tablished the facts of history and masters them through the process of
interpretation, between a view of history having the centre of gravity
in the past and the view having the centre of gravity in the present. '04
Carr indicates that the problems relate to the presence or absence of a
comprehensive historical record. While both religion clauses of the first
amendment are historically based, that base is not tied to an easily deci-
pherable record. Ample room exists for the current Court to eschew the
historical record and identify a religious motive in the maintenance of
Sunday closing laws.105 Realistically, as in the race area, the Court proba-
99. Id at 83-84.
100. Id
101. The justification for the government's action in Pruneyard is insubstantial. Other
cases may be overdue for reversal. See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878)
(polygamy conviction of Mormon). Sunday closing exemptions seem much closer to the
exemption of Jehovah's Witnesses from an obligatory flag salute. West Virginia State Bd. of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
102. See text accompanying note 21 supra.
103. See L. TRIBE, supra note 10, at 816-18.
104. E. H. CARR, WHAT IS HISTORY? 33-34 (1961).
105. While enactment of the Sunday closing laws was unquestionably the work of reli-
gious zealots, the Sunday closing cases can lead to the conclusion that even the maintenance
of current restrictions is substantially motivated by a similar religious fervor on the part of
legislatures and the public. The philosophy of legislative deference, symbolized by Mc-
Gowan, precludes the Court from closely scrutinizing the motives of state legislatures so
long as any set of facts could justify the measure. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420,
468-70 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). The Warren Court also refused to question the
underlying motives of a draft card burning statute in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367,
383-85 (1968). See Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79
YALE L.J. 1205 (1970).
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bly will be respectful of the historical work of earlier Justices; other com-
mentators, however, have questioned the history of Sunday closing laws as
announced by the Court in McGowan and its companion cases. 106 As Pro-
fessor Tribe has indicated, "[t]he historical record is ambiguous."',0 7 The
meaning of arguments made over the centuries that a day of rest serves
secular health needs in addition to spiritual needs is not clear. Does the
fact that reformers of social conditions would use religion to seek their
ends affect how we should view the arguments for Sunday closing laws?
Might a Christian zealot use a secular public welfare argument to mask the
true purpose of Sunday closings? The history of these laws is not dissimi-
lar to the morass of history surrounding the Civil War constitutional
amendments, a record found to be inconclusive in Brown v. Board of Edu-
cation '08 and demonstrated to be conflicting in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer
Co. 109 In Brown the Court stated no specific historical basis under the
fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause for its ruling that racial
segregation in the public schools is unconstitutional." 0 The Court in
Jones considered the history of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 in an attempt
to justify its conclusion that Congress had the power to prohibit private
discrimination in housing. I I The propriety of extending reconstruction
civil rights legislation to private discrimination was, at best, clouded by the
voluminous and often contradictory record." 1 2 Eschewing the historical
arguments, the Court ruled that private discrimination in housing was pro-
hibited.
This discussion should not lead to the conclusion that historical data
should be ignored. Often history is not so murky and can guide interpreta-
tion. Historical traditions may well provide insight to those attempting to
interpret open-ended edicts such as the due process and equal protection
clauses. The record may contain valuable information about the ideals of
society and its expectations of fairness. While it may not be dispositive,
In a different context, but applicable by analogy, the Burger Court, in its interpretation of
the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause, has moved away from the effects analy-
sis of the Warren Court and now requires a finding of intentional or purposeful discrimina-
tion in government practices challenged under both the equal protection clause and the
fifteenth amendment. For equal protection cases, see Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S.
256 (1979); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252
(1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). For a case decided under the fifteenth
amendment, see City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980) (racial effect of at-large elec-
tions insufficient to establish constitutional violation).
106. See generally S. COBB, THE RISE OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN AMERICA (1902); H.
ECKENRODE, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE IN VIRGINIA (1910); M. HOWE, THE
GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS (1965). Ironically, the significance of Sunday in the Chris-
tian religion has itself been questioned. See S. BACCHIOCCHI, FROM SABBATH TO SUNDAY:
A HISTORICAL INVESTIGATION OF THE RISE OF SUNDAY OBSERVANCE IN EARLY CHRISTI-
ANiTY (1977); W. RORDORF, SUNDAY (1968); Bacchiocchi, Sunday.- Holy or Holiday?, 74
LIBERTY 16 (1979).
107. L. TRIBE, supra note 10, at 816.
108. 347 U.S. 483, 489 (1954).
109. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
110. 347 U.S. at 489-95.
111. 392 U.S. at 431-37.
112. Id at 435-37.
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history may help identify the goals of the framers and our civilization.
History cannot aid decision making, however, when it offers only unveri-
fied recollections. This is all that is available in the matter of Sunday clos-
ing laws; thus, the Court should base its conclusions on other types of
information.
When the Court established in Runyon v. McCrary 13 that discrimina-
tion in admissions to private schools on the basis of race was properly
proscribed by a congressional enactment, 1 4 Justice Stevens indicated that
he had substantial doubts about the historical truths and the result in
Jones.1 5 Nevertheless, he joined the Court in endorsing the Jones history
because the result of legitimizing private racial discrimination would be
contrary to his understanding of today's mores. 16 Ironically, retention of
an assumed inaccurate historical record resulted in protection of minorities
from majority tyranny, while the retention of the historical image estab-
lished by the Sunday closing cases carries quite the opposite result. De-
spite disparate interpretations of the historical origin of Sunday closing
laws, upholding a restriction of religious liberty on the basis of unverifiable
historical recollections is troubling, particularly so because religious toler-
ance has little historical precedent. 117
D. Clash Between Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses
Throughout these religion cases a tension exists when the Court at-
tempts to discuss establishment clause issues in a vacuum removed from
the problems of the free exercise clause."18 This difficulty arises, in part,
from the confusion over the meaning of the establishment clause. Most of
the problems, however, stem from the Court's insensitivity toward diver-
sity in religious practices and a gnawing desire to identify a simplistic
"neutral principle." Arguably, two underlying premises of McGowan and
Braunfeld are a concern that exempting the non-Sunday Sabbatarian from
a Sunday closing law would create a monopoly or governmental favorit-
ism for one or more religious sects and the belief that the establishment
clause requires strict neutrality.1 9 Such neutrality prohibits statutory reli-
113. 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
114. Id at 172-73 (racial exclusion practiced by schools was classic violation of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 (1976)).
115. 427 U.S. at 189-92 (Stevens, J., concurring); see Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392
U.S. 409 (1968).
116. Id.
117. For a description of the religious bias which pervaded pre-Constitutional America,
see L. PFEFFER, supra note 5, at 71-90. But see Little, Thomas Jefferson's Religious Views and
their Influence on the Supreme Court's Interpretation of the First Amendment, 26 CATH. U.L.
REV. 57 (1976). For a general discussion of additional aspects of liberty, see Wright, Politics
and the Constitution: Is Money Speech?, 85 YALE L.J. 1001, 1020-21 (1976).
118. Some of the worst examples of insensitivity towards the free exercise clause arise
under title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See, e.g., Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429
F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970), af'd by an equally divided Court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971); Anderson v.
General Dynamics Convair Aerospace Div., 489 F. Supp. 782 (S.D. Cal. 1980). See notes
134-57 infra and accompanying text.
119. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 608-09 (1961); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S.
420, 516 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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gious classifications, whether they burden or benefit specific religions, as
well as any exemption based upon religious status that would violate an
equal protection neutrality principle.' 20 This result would be logical if the
first amendment contained only an establishment clause; there is, however,
also a free exercise clause. 12' In each case both of these important clauses
must be accommodated. Government must not allow its so-called reli-
gion-blind laws to interfere with religious practice; the free exercise clause
should be superior.
Few would argue that the need for decorum in a courtroom requires an
orthodox Jew to remove his hat, although others may be made to do so.' 22
Creating an exception to the neutral rule, however, would violate literal
notions of strict neutrality. What should be the result if election day falls
upon a high holiday of a minority faith? Strict neutrality would force a
decision between religion and state, precisely the decision that the estab-
lishment clause was intended to prevent.123 This notion of strict neutrality
was certainly rejected in Sherbert v. Verner,124 in which the state was re-
quired to make an exception on behalf of non-Sunday Sabbatarians from
the neutral rules of the state unemployment compensation law.' 25 Any
remnant of the simplistic quest for neutral principles in a religion-blind,
no-exemptions rule was put to rest in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 126 in which an
exemption from compulsory education was mandated under the require-
ments of the free exercise clause. 127
Professor Tribe has identified three major interpretations of the framers'
intent in creating the establishment clause. First, Roger Williams advo-
cated a system whereby state aid to religion without control would provide
the ideal balance. 128 Secondly, Thomas Jefferson's view was the "wall of
separation," or strict neutrality view, in advocating government avoidance
of any involvement in religious affairs. 129 Finally, James Madison's posi-
tion precluded governmental interference with religion, but emphasized
that government should not place any direct or indirect burdens on indi-
viduals because of their religion or beliefs. 130
While Professor Tribe suggests that the real purpose of the establish-
120. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312-14 (1952); P. KURLAND, RELIGION AND THE
LAW 18 (1962); Kurland, OfChurch and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. i
(1961); see P. KAUPER, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 45-79 (1964); Louisell, Does the
Constitution Require A Purely Secular Society?, 26 CATH. U.L. REV. 20 (1976). There is also
the close analogy of the need to guarantee both equality and liberty. Equality is achieved
when everyone's liberty is curtailed. Liberty may be abridged only at the point that fair and
equal treatment of others is seriously endangered.
121. See note 9 supra.
122. Close-it Enterprises v. Weinberger, 64 A.D.2d 686, 407 N.Y.S.2d 587 (1978).
123. Michaelson ex rel. Lewis v. Booth, 437 F. Supp. 439 (D.R.I. 1977).
124. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
125. See notes 76-86 supra and accompanying text.
126. 406 U.S. 205 (1972); see notes 91-92 supra and accompanying text.
127. 406 U.S. at 234-35.
128. See L. TRIBE, supra note 10, at 817. Tribe refers to this as the "evangelical view."
Id at 816.
129. Id. at 816-19.
130. Id
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ment clause was to keep the federal government out of state religion, 131 we
are left with the Court's history: a blend of Jefferson's and Madison's
views that seek a church-state separation and uninhibited free exercise of
religion, potentially incompatible goals that require sensitive accommoda-
tion. The problem raised by the government's providing chaplains in the
military is illustrative. Hiring chaplains and financing their missions could
be said to be beyond the power of a nation with an establishment clause;
however, to deprive the conscript or the patriotic religious adherent of ac-
cess to spiritual guidance and the sacraments of his or her faith can be seen
to represent an invasion of the soldier's right to exercise his religious lib-
erty freely. Such an unfair choice, serving one's country or one's conscien-
tious beliefs, is not the type that a nation with a free exercise clause should
impose upon its citizens, yet this is precisely the type of choice that was
imposed on non-Sunday Sabbatarians in McGowan v. Maryland. This
overlap of the two clauses was observed recently by the Court in McDaniel
v. Paty, 32 wherein the Tennessee Constitution barred ministers from serv-
ing in the legislature. While the Court was split over the precise rationale
for its holding, the opinions agreed that a person should not be endowed
arbitrarily with disabilities based on religious or philosophical beliefs. The
status of minister is simply an indication of the depth of sincerity of one's
religious beliefs. Neither McGowan nor Braunfeld engaged in such a sen-
sitive balancing; thus McDaniel, as well as Sherbert and Yoder, suggest a
reconsideration of the Sunday closing law cases.' 33
131. Id. at 819.
132. 435 U.S. 618 (1978).
133. In Thomas v. Review Bd., 101 S. Ct. 1425, 67 L. Ed. 2d 624 (1981), Indiana denied
unemployment compensation to a Jehovah's Witness who voluntarily left work for religious
reasons upon discovering that he was constructing the contemporary equivalent of the Sher-
man tank. The Supreme Court of the United States reversed the decision of the Indiana
Supreme Court and held that the denial of benefits violated the petitioner's free exercise
right. The Court noted that the fact that other members of the church did not object to
working on tanks did not preclude the petitioner from basing his opposition on religious
beliefs. The infringement of his liberty was not less just because others of the same sect
disagreed. In so deciding, the Court underscored both the validity and duty of states' ac-
commodation of reasonable religious practices. Sensitive accommodation may loosen fur-
ther the doctrinal foundation of Braunfeld and McGowan.
The alternative to religious accommodation is the creation of a neutrality that may be
hostile to religion. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 672-73 (1970); see L. TRIBE, supra
note 10, at 821. The first amendment certainly was not intended as a preference for atheism.
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952), Professor Tribe argues that what is compelled
by the free exercise clause should not be forbidden by the establishment clause. L. TRIBE,
supra note 10, at 827-28, 839-40.
The cases holding that conscientious objectors are exempt from military duty lend
credence to this approach, although they were decided on statutory grounds. See Gillette v.
United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971); Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970). While
Justice Harlan's opinion in Welsh suggested that one has no constitutional right to conscien-
tious objector status, that view may be based primarily upon the assessment of a compelling
government interest in self-preservation. Id at 360 n. 12 (Harlan, J., concurring). Sherbert
suggests that such dicta are flawed if based on the establishment clause and are troublesome
under the free exercise clause for failing to discuss less restrictive alternatives. Some have
argued that neutrality is not violated when a measure contains a secularly relevant factor.
See L. TRIBE, supra note 10, at 821-22; Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and
Doctrinal Development Part II. The Nonestablishment Principle, 81 HARV. L. REV. 513, 519
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III. ACCOMMODATION OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM UNDER TITLE VII OF
THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964
The religious freedom issues that surround the Sunday closing law cases
are related tangentially to the accommodation of religious freedom under
federal statutory law. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 proscribes employer
discrimination in the workplace on the basis of an employee's religion. 134
Although cases arising under this section are voluminous, 135 of particular
interest is the Court's handling of religious freedom claims under the Sun-
day closing laws compared with its handling of claims under title VII re-
lating to the issue of to what extent an employer must accommodate an
employee's religion when the employee cannot for religious reasons work
on a scheduled workday that happens to fall on his or her Sabbath. The
Court considered this precise issue in 1977 in Trans WorldAirlines, Inc. v.
Hardison .136
In Hardison the Court upheld an employer's discharge of a member of
the Worldwide Church of God for his religion-based refusal to work on
Saturday. Speaking for the Court, Justice White noted the statutory defi-
nition of religion in title VII under the 1972 amendments "includes all
aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief' but observed
that some discrimination may be allowed if "an employer demonstrates
that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee's or prospec-
tive employee's religious observance or practice without undue hardship
on the conduct of the employer's business."' 137 Although he found little
statutory or administrative guidance as to the extent of the employer's ac-
commodation obligation, 138 Justice White ruled that the employer's dis-
charge of Hardison did not violate title VII because the employer's efforts
to accommodate Hardison's religion were reasonable in light of the em-
ployer's adherence to a collectively bargained seniority system. 139 The
Court defined "undue hardship" as something greater than any de minimis
cost necessary to accommodate Hardison's religious justification for refus-
ing to work on Saturday.14° These additional costs were present in this
(1968). The avoidance of discrimination based upon religion could be regarded as such a
secular goal. See generally Note, Establishment Clause Neutrality and the Reasonable Accom-
modation Requirement, 4 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 901, 931-34 (1977).
134. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1976) provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.
135. No attempt will be made to identify all of the discrimination cases involving reli-
gious classifications. The extent of employer intolerance can be symbolized by cases such as
Shah v. MetPath Corp., 470 F. Supp. 158 (E.D. Pa. 1979). See generally Annot., 22 A.L.R.
FED. 580 (1975).
136. 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
137. Id at 73-74. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1976).
138. 432 U.S. at 75.
139. Id at 77.
140. Id at 84.
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case, according to the Court, because to require TWA to pay Hardison for
his Saturday off would create "unequal treatment of employees on the ba-
sis of their religion" in contravention to the literal wording of title VII.In4
Arguably, the employer's act was neutral, and if the employer had been
the state, no finding of unconstitutional religious discrimination would
have been made. Title VII, however, contemplates the potential discrimi-
natory effects of neutral employment practices on religious groups and re-
quires more than the employer's not hiring, firing, or making promotion
decisions because of the applicant's or employee's religion. The statute
demands that the employer accommodate the free exercise practices of an
employee except when the result would constitute an "undue hardship." 
42
Such an "undue hardship" seemingly was presented by the Hardison facts.
The Court found that the existence of a collectively bargained seniority
system, whereby no employee had to forego a Saturday off for Hardison,
and a neutral work rule prohibiting more than one job transfer within a
six-month period constituted more than a de minimis burden.' 43 Justice
Marshall, in his dissent, aptly characterized the majority opinion as
presenting "the cruel choice of surrendering . . . religion or ... job."14
141. Id. at 84-85.
142. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1976). Professor Tribe suggests that the phrase is
equivalent to the rule of Sherbert that the state must accommodate if such requires "no
significant sacrifice." L. TRIBE, supra note 10, at 853. The provision was established in the
1972 amendments to title VII. Its antecedent was a regulation issued by the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the entity charged with enforcement of title VII. In
1966 the EEOC initially issued a rule requiring accommodation "where such accommoda-
tion can be made without serious inconvenience to the conduct of the business." 31 Fed.
Reg. 8370 (1966). The rule was amended in 1967 to require accommodation "where such
accommodation can be made without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's
business." 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1(b) (1980). In light of the evolution of the rules, the statute
appears to require more than inconvenience on the part of the employer, yet the Hardison
interpretation appears to be a relaxation, equating undue hardship with mere inconvenience
or anything more than a de minimis burden.
An alternative formulation might be to require accommodation unless the refusal is "rea-
sonably necessary in support of an important or substantial interest." Moskowitz v. Wilkin-
son, 432 F. Supp. 947, 949-50 (D. Conn. 1977) (religious beliefs outweigh prison requirement
that inmates shave their beards). The standard in any case seems to require something
closer to "compelling" or "necessary" rather than merely "rational."
143. 432 U.S. at 68.
144. Id at 87 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting): "As a question of social policy, this result
is deeply troubling, for a society that truly values religious pluralism cannot compel adher-
ents of minority religions to make the cruel choice of surrendering their religion or their
job." Id Hardison may represent a greater concern for nonreligious employees than the
problems of accommodation and the intent of the statute. Note, Accommodation of Em-
ployee's Religious Practices. Trans World Airlines, Inc. P. Hardison, 15 URB. L. ANN. 311,
321-23 (1978). Justice Marshall did not attack the collectively bargained seniority system
challenged in Hardison, probably because title VII specifically recognizes and immunizes
facially valid seniority plans from scrutiny under title VII. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h)
(1976). The Court also had validated a seniority plan under the provision three weeks
before the Hardison decision so as to bar relief to a class of blacks previously discriminated
against. See Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977). This protec-
tion of seniority rights over those who have been discriminated against in the past creates
hardships and unfairness. With a recession-plagued economy, the last hired, first fired prac-
tice tends to burden inordinately both the recently hired black and the non-Sunday Sabbata-
rian. Only minimal interference with seniority and other collectively bargained agreements
is necessary to accommodate religion or compensate for injuries resulting from religious or
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The rationale for not bending a work rule or even a seniority agreement to
assure accommodation is difficult to perceive because Hardison would
have worked a different shift and on popular holidays. 45 He even was
willing to work overtime at regular pay to compensate TWA for having to
pay overtime compensation to another employee until he acquired suffi-
cient seniority to opt out of a Saturday requirement. 146
Fortunately, the lower court decisions under title VII since Hardison
have not been so unsupportive of the needs of religious minorities and
non-Sunday Sabbatarians.147 While federal and state courts have been
anything but uniform in their treatment of problems of accommodation,
some trends are emerging. An employer must accommodate reasonable
employee requests to be absent on their Sabbath or other religious holi-
days where no collectively bargained seniority agreement to the contrary
exists.' 48 Additionally, conscientious religious objections to joining or
supporting a union must be honored.' 49 Nonetheless, arguments that spe-
cific job assignments violate religious scruples' 50 and create special bur-
racial discrimination. Such compensation is a significant goal, one that is compelling and
necessary if the equality, liberty, and tolerance upon which the Constitution is based are to
prevail.
145. 432 U.S. at 94.
146. Id at 95.
147. See, e.g., Brown v. General Motors Corp., 601 F.2d 956 (8th Cir. 1979); Hill, Rea-
sonable Accommodation and Religious Discrimination Under Title VII. A Practitioner's
Guide, 34 ARB. J., Dec. 1979, at 19.
148. See, e.g., Brown v. General Motors Corp., 601 F.2d 956 (8th Cir. 1979); Riley v.
Bendix Corp., 464 F.2d 1113 (5th Cir. 1972); Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324
(6th Cir. 1970), aff'dper curiam by an equally divided Court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971); Willey v.
Maben Mfg., Inc., 479 F. Supp. 634 (N.D. Miss. 1979); Wondzell v. Alaska Wood Prods.,
Inc., 601 P.2d 584 (Alaska 1979), appeal dismissed, 444 U.S. 1040 (1980); Rankins v. Com-
mission on Professional Competence, 24 Cal. 3d 167, 593 P.2d 852, 154 Cal. Rptr. 907, ap-
peal dismissed, 444 U.S. 986 (1979); Hildebrand v. California Unemployment Ins. Appeals
Bd., 19 Cal. 3d 765, 566 P.2d 1297, 140 Cal. Rptr. 151 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1068
(1978); California Teachers Ass'n v. Board of Trustees, 70 Cal. App. 3d 431, 138 Cal. Rptr.
817 (1977). While Hardison stopped short of defining what de minimis entails, the EEOC
has issued guidelines that require the employer or union to offer the least disadvantageous of
any existing alternatives. The guidelines encourage voluntary substitutes and swaps, flexible
scheduling, lateral transfers, and change-of-job assignment. Infrequent payment of pre-
mium wages for substitute employees is deemed required, while regular payment is consid-
ered an undue hardship.
Administrative costs necessary to provide accommodation are presumed to be de minimis.
45 Fed. Reg. 72,610 (1980) (to be codified in 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2).
149. Yott v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 602 F.2d 904 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 928 (1980); Burns v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 589 F.2d 403 (9th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1072 (1979); McDaniel v. Essex Int'l, Inc., 571 F.2d 338 (6th Cir. 1978);
Tooley v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 476 F. Supp. 1027 (D. Or. 1979); Wondzell v. Alaska
Wood Prods., Inc., 601 P.2d 584 (Alaska 1979), appeal dismissed, 444 U.S. 1040 (1980); see
Anderson v. General Dynamic Convair Aerospace Div., 489 F. Supp. 782 (S.D. Cal. 1978)
(religious accommodation requirement of title VII violates establishment clause). Contra,
Gavin v. Peoples Natural Gas Co., 613 F.2d 482 (3d Cir. 1980) (reversal of district court
holding that title VII accommodation requirement unconstitutional).
150. Thomas v. Review Bd., 101 S. Ct. 1425, 67 L. Ed. 2d 624 (1981) (unemployment
compensation may not be denied to Jehovah's Witness for voluntarily leaving work when
assigned to work on armament production); Gavin v. Peoples Natural Gas Co., 613 F.2d 482
(3d Cir. 1980) (refusal of Jehovah's Witness to raise American flag). See also Palmer v.
Board of Educ., 603 F.2d 1271 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1026 (1980) (refusal of
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dens resulting from neutral practices have met with mixed results.' 5'
Plaintiffs have been unsuccessful in seeking an exception from military
uniform requirements. 152 Prisons accommodate reasonable requests for
special diets, 53 at least those prisons in the federal system.' 54 The right of
a religious group to be recognized and obtain access to the prison chapel is
unsettled.155 Those whose religion dictates the assumption of a new name
cannot be penalized. 56 As title VII and the emerging constitutional re-
quirement of accommodation converge with the civil rights revolution of
recent decades and its concomitant freedom to participate in nontradi-
tional faiths, the courts may expect to be the focal point for resolving the
accommodation question. 57
Jehovah's Witness to teach patriotic curriculum including the pledge of allegiance); Chap-
man v. Pickett, 491 F. Supp. 967 (C.D. 11. 1980) (Black Muslim prisoner excused from
handling pork while on kitchen duty); Haring v. Blumenthal, 471 F. Supp. 1172 (D.D.C.
1979) (mere inconvenience to allow Roman Catholic Internal Revenue Service employee to
disqualify himself from processing exemption application of abortion advocacy group).
151. See, e.g., Kantor v. Dunn, 17 FAIR EMPL. PRAC. CASES (BNA) 657 (W.D. Tenn.
1976), aff'd, 571 F.2d 581 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 823 (1978) (upheld requirement of
taking employment test on Saturday or in city 200 miles away as applied to an orthodox
Jew).
152. See, e.g., Sherwood v. Brown, 619 F.2d 47 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct.
317, 66 L. Ed. 2d 147 (1980) (member of Sikh religion, which requires wearing of a turban,
discharged for refusal to wear helmet).
153. Kahane v. Carlson, 427 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1975) (must provide Kosher food for
orthodox Jew); Schlesinger v. Carlson, 489 F. Supp. 612 (M.D. Pa. 1980) (must provide hot
plate and special room for preparation of Passover meal for Jewish prisoner).
154. See 23 C.F.R. §§ 547.13(a)-(b) (1980) (provision of Kosher food mandated by regu-
lation) (following Kahane decision). See also Moskowitz v. Wilkinson, 432 F. Supp. 947 (D.
Conn. 1977) (prison officials cannot require orthodox Jew to shave).
155. Compare Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972) (prison officials must accommodate reli-
gious needs of Buddhist), with Jones v. Bradley, 590 F.2d 294 (9th Cir. 1979) (self-pro-
claimed pastor of the Universal Life Church denied access to chapel and right to perform
prisoner marriages; however, prisoner failed to request alternative room with less security
problems and to present an outside sponsor for church). The underlying problem in Jones
was that the prison officials believed that there was no intent to use the chapel for religious
purposes. 590 F.2d at 296. This raises the spectre of groups that claim religious status in the
face of traditional suspicion of new religions. No attempt will be made here to resolve the
problem of defining religion except to warn of the dangers. The focus should be upon the
sincerity of the adherent and the centrality of questioned practice in light of compelling state
interests. For the problem of one group, the Church of the New Song, compare Church of
the New Song v. Establishment of Religion on Taxpayers Money in the Fed. Bureau of
Prisons, 620 F.2d 648 (7th Cir. 1980) (res judicata that church is not legitimate), with Loney
v. Scurr, 474 F. Supp. 1186 (S.D. Iowa 1979) (sincerity of Church of the New Song identi-
fied).
156. See, e.g., Masjid Muhammad-D.C.C. v. Keve, 479 F. Supp. 1311 (D. Del. 1979)
(invalidated requirement of use of prior non-Muslim name on pain of punishment or loss of
privileges).
157. In Anderson v. General Dynamics Convair Aerospace Div., 489 F. Supp. 782 (S.D.
Cal. 1980), the court held that the accommodation requirement of title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act was unconstitutional. The underlying rationale for judicial insensitivity toward
the plight of the nonconforming minority is captured in Judge Learned Hand's opinion in
Otten v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 205 F.2d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 1953):
The First Amendment protects one against action by the government. . . but
it gives no one the right to insist that in the pursuit of their own interests others
must conform their conduct to his own religious necessities. . . . We must
accommodate our idiosyncracies, religious as well as secular, to the com-
promises necessary in communal life; and we can hope for no reward for the
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IV. ANALOGY TO RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
The problems of the racial minority group member in obtaining equal
opportunity bear a certain resemblance to the treatment of religious mi-
norities. 158 Initially, there is the similarity of exemption from work rules
sacrifices this may require beyond our satisfaction from within, or our expec-
tations of a better world.
(quoted in Anderson, 489 F. Supp. at 791). The popular sentiment of the "melting pot"
theory whereby all in a democracy should engage in assimilation of majority values, prac-
tices, and beliefs is, in fact, an anathema to the concept of a free society.
The court in Anderson used the theory of entanglement, as the Civil Rights Act invited
inquiries into the sincerity of religious beliefs, but such an inquiry is not a violation of the
establishment clause. See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944); L. TRIBE, supra note
10, at 859-80. The concern of the court in Anderson seems to be purely administrative,
precisely the concern of Justice Frankfurter with the making of exceptions for non-Sunday
Sabbatarians. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 516 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concur-
ring).
The constitutionality of the accommodation provision of title VII, however, was implicitly
validated in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977). See also Gavin v.
Peoples Natural Gas Co., 613 F.2d 482 (3d Cir. 1980).
While this Article identifies the accommodation clause of title VII to be at least constitu-
tional, and arguably mandatory, despite decisions such as Anderson, the troubling problems
of applicability of title VII to churches and their related activities will not be discussed
extensively. Although National Labor Relations Bd. v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490
(1979), ruling that the National Labor Relations Act was inapplicable to parochial school
teachers on statutory grounds, suggests that the establishment clause prohibition of excessive
entanglement constitutionally might preclude such regulation, this should not mean blanket
immunity from government regulation, including the Civil Rights Act. Such immunity
might mean that religious entities would be free to discriminate against other minorities.
Even if room for debate exists as to whether some oversight of chantable tax exemptions is
compatible with free exercise and establishment, there can be little doubt that churches must
comply with fire codes, trash dumping, and other environmental and safety laws. Neverthe-
less, difficult conceptual problems arise when sex and race discrimination laws are applied to
religious entities. Can a sect refuse to appoint women priests? Can a church refuse to hire a
janitor not of the faith? What if the refusal is for the same position but at the church school?
What if the company that makes the books for the school is owned by the church: can it
refuse to hire the nonmember janitor? What of the diversified church that owns the lumber
mill or timber operation that supplies the paper for the school books and hymnals? Com-
mon sense dictates that this "House that Jack Built" scenario requires some sensitive balanc-
ing. The starting point could be the concept developed by the Court in National League of
Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), in which the problem of federal regulation of state
government activities was resolved by the standard of autonomy for essential state functions.
Religious autonomy should be determined by reasonable standards of sincerity and central-
ity so that essential religious functions would be immune from nonessential state regulation.
Admittedly, this response is not perfect. It probably would satisfy the problem of ministerial
appointments or even religious school teacher appointments, but the situations of janitors
and others are less clear. Churches could well argue that the role models exposed to chil-
dren should be the faithful. While the arguments as applied to the book publisher or lumber
mill become tenuous, they are more persuasive when applied to a religious commune. I
would urge autonomy for the latter, if sincere. Like all areas of religious freedom, the ques-
tions raised here cannot be resolved by simplistic neutral principles; there must be an accom-
modation. Hardison implies the validity of the accommodation provisions of title VII; the
Court, however, may be avoiding the constitutional question. Pfeffer, Freedom and or Sepa-
ration, 64 MINN. L. REV. 561, 577 (1980).
158. The systematic abuse of the black in America is in no way equated with the insensi-
tivity visited upon minority religious sects. See generally J. KUSHNER, supra note 62. A
parallel exists, however, in the philosophical and practical nuances of the developed consti-
tutional jurisprudence wherein unpopular minorities consistently are denied the full meas-
ure of fairness that our nation ought to provide.
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or Sunday closing laws, arguably a special preference, 15 9 to the problem of
affirmative action that arose in University of California Regents v.
Bakke. 160 In Bakke the university set aside seats in its medical school for
qualified minority applicants to correct for underrepresentation in the pro-
fession and past societal discrimination. Both the religious and racial dis-
crimination questions raise the issue of preference. A majority of a very
divided Court in Bakke held that affirmative action, not restricted to nar-
row areas of remedial relief for victims of acts of discrimination, consti-
tutes special treatment not envisioned by the Constitution or the civil
rights laws. 161 Nevertheless, a differently constituted majority endorsed
the concept of affirmative action and the principle that race requires the
government to accommodate programs devised to remedy a discriminatory
record. Thus, the Court approved the use of preferences, although not
quotas, to fill a specific number of places in the class. ' 62
The Constitution on its face speaks of rights such as equality; it does not
speak of remedies. This omission has caused the Court considerable diffi-
culty in distinguishing the two. Where egregious violations of the Consti-
tution have occurred, as has been the case with blacks, achievement of
equality requires special remedies that might amount to temporary prefer-
ences. 163 The comparison that can be drawn to the religious context is that
in a nation dominated by practices that emanate from traditional Christian
religious values, the achievement of true religious liberty as well as equal-
ity may require preferences or exceptions from strict neutrality such as
those approved in affirmative action legislation 64 and racial remedial
159. See, e.g., Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 608-09 (1961). Religious preferences
are discussed in Anderson v. General Dynamics Convair Aerospace Div., 489 F. Supp. 782
(S.D. Cal. 1980). In California Teachers Ass'n v. Board of Trustees, 70 Cal. App. 3d 431,
138 Cal. Rptr. 817 (1977), the court refused to allow a Jewish teacher to use sick pay allotted
to "personal necessity" for the religious observance of Rosh Hashanah, ruling the requested
treatment to be a windfall for religious adherents who would receive six days of paid holi-
day. Another way to view the result is that those with religious scruples receive a lower pay
than those who shun observance. Six days allotted to emergencies and necessities would
seem appropriate to religious observance and a proper accommodation. All employees
would lose pay when absences, due to religious scruples or personal hardship, exceed the
allotment. While this does not begin to satisfy the orthodox Jew who must observe as many
as 112 holy days, such an accommodation might not be an "undue burden" as the nation
moves towards the four-day work week. Even as sensitive a scholar in this field as Justice
William Brennan has expressed reservations about substantial accommodation. Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 410 (1963). The California Teachers case was decided on purely statu-
tory grounds, although county counsel had argued that any special exemption would violate
the establishment clause. See also Brown v. Stone, 378 So. 2d 218 (Miss. 1979) (invalidation
of state statutory exemption from vaccinations under the establishment clause), cert. denied,
101 S. Ct. 242, 66 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1980).
160. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
161. Id at 271. Chief Justice Burger along with Justices Stewart, Rehnquist, and Ste-
vens, in a separate opinion, concurred with Justice Powell.
162. Id. at 272. Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, in separate opinions,
concurred with Justice Powell.
163. J. KUSHNER, supra note 62, at 116-19. While the thirteenth and fourteenth amend-
ments arguably permit rather than require affirmative action, the free exercise clause man-
dates accommodation.




Another common thread between the free exercise cases and the racial
discrimination cases is the difficult requirement of proving discrimination.
The establishment clause inquiry into purpose and effect, under Mc-
Gowan, is a deferential rational basis test. Free exercise, under Braunfeld
and Sherbert, is judged by the same standard as racial discrimination, that
is, strict scrutiny; the operation of that standard in the racial context, how-
ever, requires a clear showing of purpose or intent, not simply discrimina-
tory effect. Thus, proof of a violation becomes a formidable task.' 66 This
evidentiary problem is what makes litigation of housing and school segre-
gation cases arduous. 167 The intent requirement allows discriminatory ef-
fects to be ignored. Religious exemptions, on the other hand, are judged
by an effects test or a test that recognizes that a practice will, with substan-
tial certainty, impose a discriminatory burden. Application of the religious
liberty model to the race area would result in a significant benefit for
plaintiffs. Its use would help ensure that discrimination and its effects are
not the result of insensitive realities of "color blindness."
Moreover, the proof problem also arises in employment discrimination
claims brought by racial and religious minorities. The motive for discrimi-
natory action or inaction rarely is evident. Thus, a sophisticated employer,
one capable of masking business motives, may make intent extremely diffi-
cult to establish. As a result, in order to prevail a plaintiff often will be
required to present dramatic evidence of discriminatory results that could
be explained by nothing other than racism or religious bigotry.
V. CONCLUSION
The 1961 Sunday closing cases have outlived their limited rationality.
Subsequent doctrinal evolution expanding citizens' standing and heighten-
ing the scrutiny of judicial review make a strong case for reconsideration,
as do current environmental conditions. While the Court may be cautious
in overturning established precedent, legislators should be vigilant in de-
termining the constitutionality of their acts. Religious fervor and business
protectionism probably will cause the retention of many Sunday closing
laws; enlightened legislators, however, should strive to deregulate religious
liberty.
A reconsideration of the Sunday closing cases and the problem of the
unaccommodated non-Sunday Sabbatarian casts light on the fundamental
conflict between the dictates of nonestablishment and free exercise of reli-
gion. To facilitate free exercise and to assure that the law acknowledges
diversity and freedom, the Sunday closing cases illustrate why the free ex-
set-aside for minority business enterprises contained in the Public Works Employment Act
of 1977.
165. United Steel Workers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) (upholding affirma-
tive action hiring preferences contained in a collective bargaining agreement).
166. See J. KUSHNER, supra note 62, at 98-110, for a discussion of the problems of proof.
167. Compare Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1964) (suburban school desegregation
requirements), with Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976) (housing desegregation).
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ercise clause should be accorded superior status when claims of violation
of church/state separation arise.
The conflicts over religious liberty are not resolved by simple principles.
Sensitive balancing of the concerns of religious adherents and the value of
separation will continue to be required, just as they are required in inter-
preting other first amendment rights. The United States Supreme Court
has been increasingly vigilant in protecting the rights of religious minori-
ties. Recent developments of the Burger Court suggest an evolution to-
ward increasing that protection to its most advanced status yet.
Democracy and the first amendment require that dissenting religious views
be afforded the same rights enjoyed by the majority. These principles
should compel the Court to reevaluate religious liberty questions, includ-
ing accommodation and the Sunday closing laws, as it moves toward artic-
ulating the central meaning of religious liberty.
